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Beyond revanchism? Learning from sanctioned homeless encampments in the U.S.

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ABSTRACT

To manage the growing homelessness crisis, many U.S. cities have implemented sanctioned encampments (SEs): temporary, state-designated public spaces for camping where people experiencing homelessness (PEH) can receive key services. Praised as a more compassionate response to managing homelessness, some argue that SEs can invisibilize PEH and fail to address structural causes of the crisis. In this paper, we examine how SE managers navigate contradictory logics of care and compassion. We develop a theoretical model of SE management that arrays "revanchist" vs. "post-revanchist" approaches, construct a database of 50 existing SEs in the U.S., and then place these cases within our model. SE management approaches vary across our sample and do not follow expected patterns based on the political leanings of host city. Also, most SEs were categorized as "caring but controlling" whereas only 12% were considered "caring and autonomous." These findings challenge assertions that homelessness management has moved "beyond revanchism."

Introduction

On any given night in the U.S., around 580,000 people experience homelessness (PEH), a number that some believe to be 2.5–10.2 times undercounted (Glynn & Fox, 2019). Scholars attribute rising rates of homelessness in cities around the world to *individual* factors such as mental illness, drug and alcohol (ab)use, depression, social exclusion, and a history of trauma (Bailey et al., 2020; Batterham, 2019; Castellanos, 2016; Corinth & Rossi-de Vries, 2018; Hanson & Toro, 2020); *structural* factors and systems such as neoliberal policies, the retreat of the welfare state, lack of affordable housing, and mass unemployment (Binkovitz, 2019; Byrne et al., 2013; Cohen et al., 2019; Furlong & Cartmel, 2007; Shinn & Khadduri, 2020); or some combination of *individual* and *structural* factors (LAHSA, 2019). Comprehensive national-level studies have recently revealed, however, that the primary causal mechanism shaping homelessness is a lack of affordable or attainable housing (Colburn & Aldern, 2022; Shinn & Khadduri, 2020).

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Responses to this crisis consist primarily of piecemeal emergency measures ranging from regular sweeps of unsanctioned encampments to construction of new congregate shelters to the development of tiny-home villages (THVs) (Evans, 2020). As such, the number of PEH in the U.S. has only increased in recent years, a trend further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic (Frost, 2021). Public polling in the U.S. now reveals that the crisis is one of the highest-ranking public concerns among urban residents (Santos, 2020). Widespread homelessness is not only a U.S. phenomenon, of course, and research in Australia, India, the U.K., and several countries in the Global South reveals the growing intensity of the crisis (Clarke & Parsell, 2019; DeVerteuil, 2019; Glover-Thomas, 2008; Johnsen & Fitzpatrick, 2010; McFarlane & Desai, 2016; Scullion et al., 2015; Swanson, 2007).

Until recently, scholars have categorized responses to homelessness into revanchist vs. post-revanchist categories (Mitchell, 2003; Murphy, 2009; Smith, 1996). The former consists of more punitive measures intended to surveil, constrain, exclude, and persecute PEH through regular sweeps of unsanctioned encampments, arrests, and bans on sheltering in public space. The latter entails more compassionate, "kinder and gentler" responses intended to care for, rehabilitate, civilize, and support PEH (Mitchell, 2003; Murphy, 2009, p. 305; Smith, 1996). Moreover, a number of cities employ hybrid approaches that tend to "sit at the nexus between institutions of care and the punitive state apparatus" (Speer, 2018, p. 162). In an era of heightened attention to social justice and racial equity, such approaches can both be more politically palatable and cost-effective than revanchist approaches that tax dwindling municipal budgets (DeVerteuil, 2019).

In this paper, we study an increasingly popular innovation in the U.S. intended to provide temporary shelter and services to PEH: the sanctioned encampment (SE). To gain a richer understanding of this land use type and understand how it fits into this landscape of revanchist vs. post-revanchist approaches, we build on existing frameworks from Herring (2014), Speer (2018), and Hennigan and Speer (2019) to develop a new model for conceptualizing SE governance. The model allows assessment of SEs along two axes: the *dependence axis* ranges from control to autonomy and the *compassion axis* ranges from care to punishment. We then collect data on 50 SEs across the U.S. to understand where they are located, how they operate, who funds them, and the challenges that arise with governing this land use. We find that although the SE has several key potential benefits as a compassionate model of homelessness governance, it can further "invisibilize" PEH, impose carceral regulations on residents, and ultimately fail to address underlying structural causes of homelessness. As such, SE implementation might exemplify a broader shift in homelessness management toward a more "compassionate revanchism" (Murphy, 2009; Hennigan & Speer, 2019). Given the increasing prevalence of SEs in U.S. cities and beyond, especially since the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2020, the paper provides key insights for planners, policymakers, advocates, and homelessness service providers seeking to understand the future of this new land use type. Below we outline typical responses to urban homelessness to determine where SEs fit within this management landscape.

Responses to urban homelessness in the U.S.

Responses to homelessness occur in three phases: inflow, crisis response, and outflow (Solari et al., 2020). *Inflow* is the stage in which advocates attempt to prevent

homelessness before it begins. "In study after study," Colburn and Aldern (2022) argue, "the most effective treatment for homelessness is housing" (p. 63). *Crisis response* includes deterrence by criminalization, provision of mental and physical health services, and construction of congregate shelters, as well as recent initiatives such as tiny home villages (THVs) and SEs. *Outflow* is the stage in which individuals leave their experience of homelessness and, ideally, return to sustainably affordable housing. Nearly all municipal and federal funding currently flows to the more reactive *crisis response* stage, even as this does little to address the structural causes of homelessness (Colburn & Aldern, 2022).

In cities around the U.S., authorities tend to manage visible homelessness through revanchist strategies intended to control the geography and behaviors, or the places and practices, of PEH. Most anti-homeless measures tend to criminalize PEH for sleeping, sheltering oneself, panhandling, sitting, or eating in public spaces. A 2014 survey by the National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty found that 34% of major U.S. cities imposed citywide bans on sheltering in public, and 57% prohibited sheltering in defined areas (Bailey et al., 2020; Cohen et al., 2019; Darrah-Okike et al., 2018; NLCHP, 2019). Since the 1990s, cities in the UK and Australia have also increasingly adopted such "sit and lie" ordinances (Herring et al., 2019). The underlying rationale for this punitive enforcement, many argue, has been "to create a visual landscape that was conductive to middle-class consumption and leisure" (Speer, 2018, p. 575). Such laws aim to sanitize downtowns to commodify urban space and attract global "footloose" capital (Davis, 1990). They are intended to enforce civility, foster economic growth, reduce crime, and encourage PEH to seek congregate shelter and/or utilize available public services or face prosecution (Németh, 2006; Robinson, 2019).

To realize these priorities, municipal authorities regularly conduct "sweeps" of unsanctioned homeless encampments which are enforced by move-along orders (orders to move one's self and belonging to a different location), destruction and seizure of personal belongings, and citations and arrests (Gordon & Byron, 2021; Westbrook & Robinson, 2021). In 2018, the Ninth Circuit Court's Martin v. City of Boise ruling (Martin v. City of Boise, 2018) gave cities legal authority to conduct such sweeps provided they have enough shelter space available to accommodate their latest count of PEH. Critics argue that these measures tend to simply shift the location of PEH to less visible areas and often fail to connect PEH to the services they need (Darrah-Okike et al., 2018). Speer (2017), however, argues that residents of these self-sufficient encampments are claiming a radical "right to the city" via the self-determination, independence, and informal upgrading that often exists within such encampments. Even when sweeps do not result in arrest, persistent contact with the police can produce psychological burdens that have lasting negative effects (Clarke & Parsell, 2020; Herring et al., 2019). Often justified by public health concerns, regular sweeps can also upend even a "modicum of privacy" while disrupting established social networks, emotional solace, hygiene routines, and mobility patterns (Langegger & Koester, 2017; Murphy, 2009, p. 322).

From revanchist to post-revanchist practices

Responses to PEH in public space have, in a number of cases, shifted from a strictly punitive, revanchist approach towards a more compassionate approach in recent years (Margier, 2021). Several decades ago, authorities' responses to burgeoning homelessness

in cities such as New York City and Los Angeles was "antagonist, oppressive and punitive – part of an allegedly revanchist project (an attempt by more powerful groups in society to regain, by force if necessary, their territorial domination over less powerful groups) to reclaim prime spaces … from homeless people for the benefit of international capital" (Scullion et al., 2015, p. 419). Recognizing the futility and cost associated with such approaches, many cities in the U.S., UK, New Zealand, and Australia have begun to prioritize "spaces of care" that promote increased social services, physical and mental health treatment, vocational education, food assistance, services for those with disabilities, and provision of temporary housing for women and children (Hennigan & Speer, 2019, p. 907; Johnsen & Fitzpatrick, 2010; Laurenson & Collins, 2007; MacLeod, 2002; Parr, 2022; Walsh, 2011). The accelerating crisis of homelessness has forced hundreds of communities to experiment with emergency housing provision and other innovative practices that move them beyond "business as usual" (Johns, 2021; Tingerthal, 2021).

Yet any perceived shift from revanchism towards post-revanchism is far from absolute. Recent work reveals blurred lines between punishment and care that are especially pronounced in the congregate shelter system (Hennigan & Speer, 2019; Speer, 2018). Traditional shelters provide critical emergency services but have several shortcomings: they are often open during evening hours only; they can require residents to enroll in long waitlists before they enter; they often have high barriers to entry (e.g. no pets, no partners, no outstanding warrants, and full sobriety); they can fail to provide safe storage for resident's personal belongings; and they often exclude people from the transgender community (Cohen et al., 2019; Herring, 2021). PEH who are accepted into shelters can then be subject to strict norms, surveillance, and prohibitions, severely restricting their personal autonomy (Clarke & Parsell, 2020; Speer, 2018). At the same time, PEH who refuse to subject themselves to these regulations can be deemed "service-resistant" and, thus, subject to further persecution and even prosecution (Clarke & Parsell, 2020). Murphy (2009) also describes how the shelter system controls the geography of homelessness by drawing PEH out of prime urban spaces and warehousing them in less visible areas far from the gaze of potential investors and future residents. In sum, DeVerteuil (2006) argues, shelters are "contradictory and nuanced institutions that contain/conceal/manage the homeless while also providing basic subsistence needs and hopefully some prevention" (p. 119).

A number of studies demonstrate the difficulty of exercising any ethic of care in homelessness management within powerful capitalist urbanization regimes. Hennigan and Speer (2019) reveal how private and non-profit service providers in Fresno, California actively lobbied for the destruction of unsanctioned encampments in order to force residents into their own facilities and benefit from the additional funding incurred therein. In the same paper, they show how the creation of a large outdoor campus to house PEH in Phoenix, Arizona received critical support from policymakers as a new "space of care" while also removing this population from the visible public spaces of the nearby gentrifying downtown (Hennigan & Speer, 2019). In cities around the U.S., law enforcement officers are receiving extensive training in coercing PEH into shelters and are asked to think and act more like social workers in their interactions (Margier, 2021). In this way, "although both care and punishment have different means and represent separate ideologies, the ends can sometimes be the same: to spatially manage poor and homeless populations to shore up capital projects in revitalizing urban areas" (Hennigan & Speer, 2019, p. 917).

The sanctioned encampment

The COVID-19 pandemic introduced a series of confounding factors that both increased homelessness in general and made the lives of those experiencing unsheltered homelessness even more difficult (Perri et al., 2020; Rodriguez et al., 2021). Traditional congregate shelters failed to provide necessary support for PEH during the pandemic, and many were forced to significantly reduce services or close down entirely due to physical distancing requirements. Those that remained open saw major increases in COVID-19 outbreaks (Fenley, 2021; Rowan et al., 2022). Providing adequate shelter space for PEH that could meet the physical distancing guidelines from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) would have cost an estimated $11.5 billion, money that cash-strapped city governments simply did not have in a time of decreased tax revenues and additional public health and protective economic expenditures (Finnigan, 2020). As such, unsanctioned encampments grew in most major cities, around the U.S., prompting increased sweeps of PEH and an unprecedented crisis of unsheltered homelessness (Rodgers, 2020; The Economist, 2021; Wilitz, 2020).

Responding to these concerns, a number of cities around the U.S. began to implement a fairly novel land use: the sanctioned encampment (SE). In general, SEs are permitted by law or ordinance and are located temporarily on public or private property. They commonly contain private tents for residents, provide shared bathrooms and dining areas, and offer services such as case management, mental health assistance, housing searches, and vocational training (Cohen et al., 2019). SEs have gained popularity in the context of COVID-19-related "states of emergency" as a more affordable and flexible alternative to the congregate shelter system (Biron, 2022; Siegler, 2022). In some instances, SEs allow pets, partners, transgender residents, and storage for larger belongings, all things usually prohibited by traditional shelters (Cohen et al., 2019; United States Interagency on Homelessness, 2018). SEs are frequently lauded as a humane, albeit temporary, approach that provides much-needed stability for PEH as they search for permanent supportive housing and receive vital services (Kang, 2022). By providing a sense of dignity, security, safety, and agency for residents, they can represent quick, tangible victories for cities seeking to portray a more compassionate image of their response to the homelessness crisis (Colburn & Aldern, 2022).

Broadly speaking, SEs are similar to tiny home villages (THVs), which also regularly offer support to residents in the form of mental and physical health care services (Evans, 2020). From a policy standpoint, both THVs and SEs typically require formal approval by municipal entities and are regulated through a specific zoning designation or special use permit (Alvarez, 2020; Cohen et al., 2019; Evans, 2020). In terms of design and cost, however, THVs and SEs are quite different. Sanctioned encampments typically utilize some form of easily disassembled tent or palette shelter for residents, whereas THVs offer more permanent construction (Evans, 2020). As the average cost of constructing a single tiny home hovered around $21,000 in 2019, THVs are a more expensive solution than SEs but offer more comfortable accommodations, better protection from the elements, and an increased sense of privacy and personal space than SEs (Evans, 2020).

Although the SE is an increasingly popular land use in many U.S. cities, little is known on a broader scale about how these spaces are developed and permitted, how they function, and whether and how they move beyond the revanchist paradigm of homelessness governance.

A new framework for conceptualizing SE governance

In this section, we develop a framework to operationalize and assess management practices of and within SEs. Our model builds on frameworks from Herring (2014), Speer (2018), and Hennigan and Speer (2019) that examine how treatment of unsanctioned and sanctioned encampments increasingly blur the lines between care and punishment.

Herring (2014) outlines common tactics to control the geography and behavior of PEH in an attempt to develop a typology of "homeless seclusion" (p. 290). This framework includes two axes: one that evaluates the institutionalization or informality of encampments and another that assesses the independence or repression of PEH within encampments. The framework results in four types of homeless seclusion – contestation, toleration, accommodation, and co-optation – that expose key contradictions within the "new logics of homeless management" (Herring, 2014, p. 289). Speer (2018) builds on this concept by arguing that despite the benefits of autonomy offered within legal encampments, they can still exist as "quasi-carceral spaces" that prioritize control over the freedoms of PEH (p. 168). Her "tent ward" concept situates the legal encampment within a broader carceral framework that reveals tensions between care and punishment. Hennigan and Speer (2019) introduce the concept of "coercive care" to demonstrate how encampments exhibit revanchist and post-revanchist logics that tend to reinforce one another in disciplining PEH (Hennigan & Speer, 2019). These frameworks usefully situate encampments in a broader landscape of homelessness management. Nevertheless, they focus on encampments in general and not on SEs more specifically. Additionally, they tend to rely on revelatory case studies instead of more comprehensive national portraits, and they catalog fieldwork undertaken years before the SE model gained popularity due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

As such, we propose a new framework (see Figure 1). The horizontal axis, which we label the *dependence axis,* comes directly from Herring (2014) and examines the levels of decision-making power of SE residents. The two extremes of the *dependence axis* represent control and autonomy, which respectively reflect revanchist and post-revanchist approaches to homelessness management. Within this axis, SEs that fall closer to the control side of the continuum are more representative of a revanchist approach to homelessness management. The vertical axis, which we label the *compassion axis,* examines what Hennigan and Speer (2019) refer to as "coercive care," and describes how the SE model can "bolster anti-homeless urban geographies despite their stated aim of promoting compassion" (p. 907). The two poles of the *compassion axis* range from punishment to care (see Hennigan & Speer, 2019). As with the dependence axis, SEs that fall closer to the punishment side of this continuum are also more representative of a revanchist approach to homelessness management.

The *dependence axis* measures the degree of agency PEH have over their movements and actions once inside the SE, whereas the *compassion axis* assesses the degree to which SE managers implement barriers to entry, locate SEs in healthy and accessible places, and provide compassionate services (Hennigan & Speer, 2019; Herring, 2014). For example, an SE might be compassionate in that it provides services and has low barriers to entry (*compassion axis*), but it might be controlling of residents by imposing strict rules related to alcohol and drug consumptions, partners, and pets (*dependence axis*).

Figure 1. Sanctioned Encampment Typology.

In the following sections, we describe the elements of SE governance that pertain to each of these axes. The *dependence axis* involves governance elements such as site rules, management style, and management entity that directly influence the amount of control residents have over their own movements and activities within the SEs as well as the control exerted upon them by site management. Following Herring (2014), this axis "describes the extent to which campers are able to independently exercise power over their encampment outside of state impositions of direct management or repression" (p. 289). Because we were interested in understanding SE governance more specifically, Herring's axis that arrays institutionalization vs. informality approaches did not apply to our study. Instead, we built on Speer's (2018) "tent ward" concept and Speer and Hennigan's (2019) focus on "quasi-carceral spaces" in introducing the *compassion axis*. This axis helps us determine how SEs fall into a continuum of punishment vs. care. Based on interviews, observations, and background research on SEs, we found that site location, services offered, and barriers to entry are the most powerful elements shaping the daily lives of SE residents and, thus, were the best ways to evaluate SEs along this axis.

The dependence axis: control vs. autonomy

Site rules

Overly prescriptive rules within SEs imposed by site managers or local governance regimes can create "quasi-carceral spaces" (Speer, 2018, p. 160; Herring, 2014). Regulatory regimes within SEs often "reflect similarly existing state-run institutions such as the shelter and jail or transitional housing" (Herring, 2014, p. 301). Such rules can severely

restrict the personal autonomy of residents, and residents who fail to submit to these rules can be threatened with removal from an SE. Eviction from SEs often result in PEH being placed back into unsanctioned encampments where they are threatened by the punitive measures of the state or local government. Throughout our web-based search, we found numerous instances of SEs that imposed authoritarian regimes that included strict curfews, requirements of participation in site maintenance, security, and case management, restricted movement to and from the site, and inability to have visitors or personal possessions within the site. Herring (2014) associates this imposition of repressive regulatory regimes with increased controls on PEH within SEs.

Management style

A number of SEs have developed democratically through long-term cooperation with residents, creating a bottom-up model that allows residents to have some say in how the SE is managed. Others have developed with a top-down management style, limiting personal and communal autonomy, and failing to give residents any control over how the site functions (Speer, 2018). The former can induce a shift from a carceral model of homelessness governance and ultimately represent a new "model of urbanism and housing for the homeless" (Speer, 2018, p. 162).

Management entity

Most SEs tend to be managed by a non-profit, often faith-based organization, and were thus subject to the rules and predilections of such organizations. Advocates for PEH have criticized the devolution of SE management duties to non-profit organizations, citing concerns about accountability, transparency, and even corruption (Elder, 2022; Margier, 2022; Moench & Fagan, 2022). In San Francisco, Urban Alchemy, the non-profit managing several San Francisco SEs and providing homeless services in over 13 cities across California, has been criticized for its role in the management of numerous SEs (Elder, 2022). Their precipitous growth, along with sizable salaries for their CEO and upper management staff, have encouraged some to accuse them of participation in an "nonprofit industrial complex" wherein homelessness management has become an increasingly profitable enterprise (Beck & Twiss, 2019 as cited in Margier, 2022; Elder, 2022; Margier, 2022, p. 6). Moreover, private owners are commonly tasked with providing land for new SEs. Margier (2022) argues that the involvement of self-interested property owners, rather than the municipal government, gives the former a mechanism to further control the places and practices of PEH with very little, if any, public accountability.

The compassion axis: punishment vs. care

Barriers to entry

Although many SEs have lower barriers to entry than a traditional congregate shelter, a number of SEs control access to PEH by requiring a clean criminal record, among other conditions that some deem as unnecessarily exclusionary (Coalition on Homelessness, 2020; Skinner & Rankin, 2016). Building upon both Speer and Hennigan (2019) and Herring (2014), barriers to entry for SEs distinguish between PEH who are "deserving" or "underserving" of care. SEs with strict barriers to entry fall towards the punitive side of

the continuum as they cater to a "deserving poor willing to submit to various behavioral requirements, mimicking the authoritarian trends within the shelters that attach work and behavioral requirements to their beds" (Herring, 2014, p. 301).

Location

The location and siting of SEs often serve as a punitive mechanism for PEH that relegate PEH to areas outside of more visible, high-value public spaces (Margier, 2021). Although SEs offer temporary benefits to PEH and potential cost savings for municipal agencies, some fear that the creation of SEs may perpetuate the mistreatment, discrimination, and criminalization of PEH in unsanctioned encampments (Arellano, 2021). As recently as September 2021, the National Coalition for the Homeless released a formal statement taking issue with the SE model, focusing especially on the potential of these encampments to further subject PEH in unsanctioned encampments to legal action (NCH, 2021).

These fears may be well-founded with recent court rulings creating a precedent for such legal action to be taken against PEH. Martin v. Boise (2018) gave cities legal authority to legally enforce anti-camping ordinances with sweeps, fines, and criminalization of PEH, provided that they have enough available shelter space, which includes tent spaces in SEs, to accommodate their population of PEH (Kang, 2022). Cities such as Sacramento have indicated that their recent interest in pursuing the creation of SEs is, thus, predicated on the Martin v. Boise ruling by creating the more affordable and temporary SEs, cities can justify sweeps of unsanctioned encampments while receiving accolades for their seemingly caring responses to urban homelessness (Arellano & Boden, 2022; Kang, 2022; Margier, 2021, 2022).

Speer (2018) has argued that encampments "are a relatively affordable and flexible means for local governments to provide emergency services in the ongoing crisis of homelessness, while also surveilling homeless people and relocating them away from prime urban areas" (p. 168). Herring and Lutz (2015) argue that SEs and the like are simply new ways to locate PEH at the margins of the city and society: out of sight, and, thus, out of mind of visitors, residents, and potential investors. Faced with regular challenges including community opposition and siting difficulties given the voluntary nature of hosting a site, SEs are often pushed into locations unsuitable for human occupancy such as vacant lots under highways or disaster-prone areas that frequently flood. SE residents can also be subject to increased exposure to air pollution, which can be detrimental to health and well-being (American Lung Association, 2021; DeMarco et al., 2020). PEH already face higher impacts from poor air quality than housed people, so locating SEs in areas of concentrated air pollution can exacerbate this disparity (DeMarco et al., 2020).

Because of their open-air location, SEs can also be subject to harsh weather conditions. As SEs typically only offer tents as shelter, residents of SEs in cities such as Phoenix and Missoula with extreme daily high and low temperatures and/or heavy precipitation face increased health risks (Siegler, 2022). Further, many SEs are located on asphalt parking lots that amplify heat and offer minimal to no protective shade (Boehm, 2021). PEH frequently suffer from chronic dehydration and related medical challenges from being unhoused, which makes them more susceptible to heat- and cold-related illness and death than the housed population (Ahmad, 2021; Chakalian, 2018).

Services

Services frequently offered by SEs including mental and physical health care, case management, housing assistance, job training, and benefits navigation (Speer, 2018). Despite a number of SEs offering substantial wraparound services to their residents, others have developed without providing any services while still imposing regulations and spatial restrictions upon residents. The supposed strength of the SE model is its ability to provide services and amenities unavailable in unsanctioned encampments, so the lack of access to these resources calls into question the benefit to PEH in SEs compared to the imposed restrictions on personal autonomy (Speer, 2018). Additionally, service offerings within SEs further expose the dichotomy between the "deserving" and "underserving" poor, as access to these critical services are predicated on entry into an SE. For this reason, we consider whether SEs offered services when locating SEs along the punitive vs. caring continuum.

Methods: developing a national snapshot of SEs in the U.S.

To better understand major concerns and key factors shaping SE governance, we used a multi-method approach including preliminary interviews, public meeting observations, and a national online search of SEs.

Interviews and observations

To understand how SEs are justified and implemented locally, our team conducted semi-structured interviews with seven experts on outreach, service, and housing provision for PEH in Denver, Colorado. All interviews took place in late 2021 and included leaders of advocacy groups, local neighborhood organizations, academic researchers, and longtime homeless activists. We conducted the interviews in person, by telephone, and by video conference, and they ranged from 15 to 60 min each. These interviews provided important insight into the key concerns about SEs in the city and elsewhere and helped us understand how the SE fits into a broader landscape of homeless management nationwide. We also visited several SEs in Denver and we attended six public meetings discussing the implementation of SEs in Denver and across California. We took notes during the interviews and public meetings, seeking to characterize people's words verbatim where possible. These activities provided an initial picture of the issues associated with the implementation of SEs, including the identification of some of the keywords we used in the search we describe below.

Building a database of SEs

Following Evans' (2020) work on THVs, we developed a database of SEs across the U.S. by conducting internet searches between October 2021 through February 2022, using search terms such as "sanctioned encampments," "safe outdoor spaces," "safe sleep villages," "sanctioned tent cities," "legal encampments," and several variations on these terms. Based on suggestions from our interviewees, we focused first on cities with existing SE programs, such as Denver, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle. For each online search, we screened the first 5–10 results for relevance and then used a snowball

method to identify additional cases. We continued this process until new searches failed to yield new results. To be included in our database, an SE had to have certain characteristics. First, it had to contain some form of temporary shelter, such as tents, rather than more permanent structures, such as tiny homes. Second, we only included SEs with enough public information that allowed us to categorize them into our framework.

Throughout our search, we sought information about how SEs were managed, whether they had partnerships with private or public entities, their size and capacity, relevant land ownership regimes, how long they have existed, their approximate costs, any barriers to entry for residents, and regular services provided. We used a spreadsheet to track these characteristics for each encampment and documented source information for each encampment. To ensure that the information extracted from documentary sources was adequately interpreted, two authors contributed to the creation of this spreadsheet. We then mapped all locations and contexts using ArcGIS Pro (version 2.8.0; ESRI, Redlands, California) based on addresses and nearest intersections listed for each SE.

Assessing SEs based on our framework

To situate these SEs within our framework, we examined several key elements: location of the site, barriers to entry, rules of the site, services provided, management entity, and management style. For all SEs, we assigned a score ranging from −1 to 1 on each of these elements according to the criteria outlined below. The positive and negative scoring provides a straightforward way for us to situate our cases along our two axes and, thus, across our four quadrants, without denoting a value judgment. Building on the framework developed by Herring (2014), we mapped each SE in our database along two continua represented by the two axes in the framework. To ensure validity and consistency within our scoring, one author scored all 50 cases we identified, and then another author separately scored 10 SEs (20% of the sample). The scoring by the two authors was consistent in 58 out of 60 (97%) instances. The completed scorecard we used for all 50 cases can be found in Appendix 1.

Site rules (*dependence axis*). SEs received a score based on the stringency of site rules. SEs with strict rules including no alcohol or drug use, restrictive curfews, requirements to participate in daily case management and site maintenance received a negative score. Conversely, we assigned positive scores to SEs with more autonomy among residents, namely those with few rules other than being respectful of other residents with a relatively high bar for resident eviction.

Management style (*dependence axis*). Some SEs exhibit a top-down management style and a lack of deference to residents when developing SE oversight. Others fail to consider residents' opinions on how they would like to participate in the site. We assigned negative scores to such sites and positive scores to SEs that championed more democratic forms of self- or co-governance.

Management entity (*dependence axis*). Our discussions with homelessness management experts revealed that SEs run by the city or restrictive religious entities tend to impose more restrictive rules upon residents, either because of the need to placate adjacent community businesses and residents or because of restrictive religious beliefs. On the other hand, SEs run by residents with volunteer support tend to allow for more

autonomy among residents. We assigned negative scores to SEs managed by a municipal body or restrictive religious entity and positive scores to resident-run SEs.

Barriers to entry (*compassion axis*). We assigned negative scores to SEs with restrictive entry barriers such as mandated sobriety, background checks, ID requirements, and exclusion of residents with prior felonies. We gave positive scores to SEs that took an approach akin to the "Housing First" model that suggests that sobriety and a clean arrest record are nearly impossible to achieve without the safety and breathing room that an SE or permanent housing can afford (Baker & Evans, 2016).

Location (*compassion axis*). The seclusion of SEs can serve both to isolate PEH from public space and to provide privacy and security for the residents within them (Herring, 2014; Speer, 2018). Yet, as many SEs are in rather undesirable locations, in disaster-prone spaces, or on otherwise hazardous lots, we decided to assign scores based on whether a site's visibility and exposure to hazards. We gave negative scores to SEs located under or within a quarter mile of a highway, in industrial areas, floodplains, or isolated vacant lots far from outside resources or transportation. We assigned positive scores to SEs embedded within communities as this can provide residents access to existing public transportation and other municipal services.

Services (*compassion axis*). We assigned negative scores to SEs that offered no services beyond the immediate needs of PEH. We gave positive scores to SEs that offered wrap-around services such as mental and physical health care, job training, housing assistance, case management, and a variety of other services.

Results: a portrait of SE revanchism in the U.S.

Our search led to the identification of 50 SEs throughout the U.S. Although our list is likely not exhaustive, we believe we provide a relatively accurate national snapshot of this increasingly popular land use. When scoring the 50 SEs, we were able to gather adequate information about the six elements for only 40 (80%) SEs.

In the remainder of this section, we first provide an overview of the findings for each of the six elements described above (e.g. site rules, location), all of which help us locate individual SEs across the two axes of our framework. Then, we describe four types of SEs based on our framework, and finally discuss geographic and political patterns of the four types of SEs in the U.S.

Description of framework elements

Site rules (*dependence axis*). Although we observed some discernable patterns among site rules within the studied SEs, there were also several unexpected outliers. For instance, we assigned negative scores to four of the nine (44%) SEs within our database that we also identified as democratically self-governed or co-governed. These overly prescriptive, paternalistic rule regimes may serve as a means of survival, ensuring the ability of the SE to remain within their host cities. In other instances, such as in San Francisco's Haight Safe Sleep Village, city-owned SEs made concerted efforts to avoid paternalistic rules, despite being located in a prime and visible public space. SEs run by religious institutions, such as Pinellas Hope and Hillsborough Hope in Florida, tended to have more restrictive rules than those run by volunteers or non-profits.

Management style (*dependence axis*). Religious organizations tended to impose a more top-down style of site management, and we assigned four out of the six (67%) SEs run by religious organizations negative scores for management style. Non-profits were more likely to co-govern SEs or assist resident-run SEs. Eight out of the 12 (67%) SEs that received positive scores for management style were given negative scores for location, mostly due to their undesirable settings near ports, under freeways, or within vacant rural lots. This suggests that more autonomy in the management of SEs might come at the expense of more seclusion or isolation of the SE itself.

Management entity (*dependence axis*). We assigned over half (53%) of the SEs a score of 0 since they were managed by a non-profit, typically contracted by the city in which they were located. Since cities and local governments are in many ways beholden to the concerns and predilections of their tax-paying constituents, these non-profits often function in a way that recognizes this chain of command, often resulting in a more top-down management style. For instance, in Denver, several of our interviewees expressed concern that because the City provides funding to SE operators, the latter are beholden to the goals and values imposed upon PEH by government leaders, leading in some cases to further pacification and surveillance of SE residents.

Barriers to entry (*compassion axis*). Out of the 40 cases we located within our quadrants, we gave 14 (35%) negative scores for their barriers to entry. Six of these SEs (43%) were democratically self-governed or co-governed. This suggests that the rigidity in barriers to entry is a means to ensure SE survival by imposing more punitive measures in order to avoid scrutiny and punishment from local governments, nearby businesses, or housed residents. We only assigned positive scores to one of the six (17%) SEs run by religious organizations. Three (50%) out of the remaining SEs received a negative score, one received a neutral score of 0, and one did not have enough information to locate within the quadrants.

Location (*compassion axis*). We assigned a negative score to 18 (45%) of the SEs we because they were relegated to less-than-desirable and even hazardous areas. We gave positive scores to only 12 (30%) SEs and neutral scores to the remaining 10 (25%) sites. All 12 of the SEs with positive scores for location were located in traditional Democratic strongholds such as Denver (Colorado), Los Angeles (California), Philadelphia (Pennsylvania), San Francisco (California), and Seattle (Washington). Of the 18 SEs that received a negative score for location, only one was located in a city that leans more conservative (Fayettville, Arkansas). This suggests that most host cities are more politically liberal. Nevertheless, management typologies are not consistent across these cities.

Services (*compassion axis*). We assigned a negative score for provided services to only eight (20%) SEs and a positive score to 25 (63%) sites. Three SEs receiving negative scores were democratically self-governed or co-governed and were thus unable to rely on government funding or partnerships with institutional entities to provide services for residents. These SEs were more reliant on volunteers or donations, resulting in their diminished capacity to provide key rehabilitational services to residents.

Four types of SEs

Having scored each SE on these individual elements we were then able to locate all sites into our four-quadrant typology (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Types of Sanctioned Encampments.

Care/Control

The quadrant that contains the highest number of SEs is the Care/Control type. Eighteen percent (18%) of SEs fall into this quadrant, signifying the blurred line between compassion and control that may be a hallmark of this model. Although these SEs offer residents supportive services and a more open-door policy on entry, managers tend to exercise measures of control over residents through more stringent site rules and authoritarian and top-down regulatory regimes. Either run by extensions of city organizations, restrictive religious entities, or government-contracted non-profits, Care/Control SEs are likely to implement prescriptive site rules that control the movement, actions, and behaviors of residents.

The average score among the nine (9) SEs in this quadrant is 1.6 along the compassion axis and −1.8 along the dependence axis. Typically, these cases had more negative scores on *management style* and *site rules* and more positive scores on *location*, *barriers to entry*, and *services*. Within these SEs, the Finley Sanctioned Encampment in Santa Rosa, California falls to the negative extreme of the dependence axis because of the strict imposition of rules at the site. Residents at this site have a strict 8 PM curfew, can only have visitors in designated areas, cannot have or use drugs or alcohol within the site, and are removed from the SE if they did not communicate any absence from the site. Nevertheless, its location at a community center with access to nearby services and the provision of extensive supportive services including case management, medical treatment, and housing services demonstrates a dedication to care that is typical of the shift towards post-revanchism. Similarly, many of the Denver SEs, such as the Park Hill SOS, fall within this quadrant because although they provide a significant number of wraparound services to their residents, managers tend to impose strict rules on PEH within the encampments. In addition, these sites are closely monitored by staff, drug and alcohol use is prohibited, and residents are prevented from receiving guests or visitors within the site. Denver SE

residents are also required to abide by a "resident use agreement" prescribed by the management entity that runs the sites.

Autonomy/Care

Within our study, nearly all of the SEs within this category are run by non-profits or volunteer groups, are democratically self-governed, or are co-run by residents together with another management entity. These forms of management allow residents to have a voice in the development of the rules within the site and the forms of oversight within the SE. Additionally, these sites either require no or few background checks, usually allowing residents with a criminal background unless it hindered their ability to locate in a certain space, such as registered sex offenders in SEs located near a school. SEs within the Autonomy/Care quadrant offer wraparound services that at minimum include case management and physical health services but, in most cases, also offer mental health services, job training, and transitional housing help. These SEs are located in areas that did not place residents in harm's way from either environmental factors or health-related hazards and were either embedded within the community, or right on the periphery, allowing residents to access transportation or other supportive services. From our database, only 6 (12%) of the SEs fit within this quadrant.

Among the six SEs falling within this quadrant, the average scores for the compassion and dependent axes are 1.8 and 1.5, respectively. Typically, the SEs within this quadrant received positive scores for the *barriers to entry* and *services* categories as well as the *management style*, *management entity*, and *site rules* categories. The Haight Safe Sleep Village in San Francisco, CA received the highest positive scores within this quadrant. Although the site is owned by the city with oversight by a local non-profit, the code of conduct was developed and decided on by the residents and the site explicitly states that they want to create an environment devoid of the punitive, carceral measures employed across other SEs. This SE also provides supportive services including healthcare and relocation services and is embedded within city fabric, allowing residents easy access to outside services that the site cannot provide.

Punishment/Autonomy

SEs that fall within the Punishment/Autonomy quadrant allow PEH to maintain a sense of personal freedom but provide few supportive services and often invisibilize residents from public view. The 6 (12%) of SEs that fall within this quadrant vary in their structure and support offered, but the majority are democratically self-governed by residents with support from non-profits with no city oversight. Although they provide autonomy, these SEs are often unable to provide the same levels of care and supportive services as SEs with top-down control. These SEs deserve further scrutiny because, despite their relative autonomy, they can place residents in harm's way by failing to provide necessary services to protect residents from disease, violence, environmental hazards, or personal conflict.

Among the SEs that fall within this quadrant, the average score along the compassion axis is −1.7 and 1.8 along the dependence axis. The SEs in this quadrant typically received negative scores for the *location* and *services* elements and positive scores on the *site rules*, *management styles* and *management entity* elements. Sammamish, Washington's long-standing Sharewheel Tent City 4 received a score of −3 along the compassion axis and a 1 along the dependence axis, demonstrating the paradoxical relationship between

autonomy and care among SEs. The site is self-organized and democratically self-governed with help from volunteers, so residents have maintained a relative degree of autonomy over site operation. Despite this degree of autonomy in terms of management, the site has some of the most stringent rules of all 50 cases studied, including the prohibition of alcohol, drugs, weapons, fighting, littering, or disturbing neighbors. Residents are also required to sign an agreement to abide by these rules; refusal to do so results in immediate removal from the site. All residents are required to have a photo ID and have to be screened for outstanding warrants or sex offender status; sobriety is also mandated at this site. Additionally, residents are required to participate in site maintenance and management and are provided few services aside from donated food, access to restrooms and trash removal, and bus tickets to commute to work. The site moves every 90 days, restricting residents' ability to create ties with local service providers.

Control/Punishment

Among the seven SEs that fell within this quadrant, average scores for the compassion and dependent axes are −1.6 and −2.6, respectively. Most SEs in this quadrant received negative scores on the majority of the six evaluative elements. San Lorenzo Park Benchlands Encampment in Santa Cruz, CA falls at the furthest extreme within this quadrant with scores of −3 along both axes. Not only is the SE located within a riverbed prone to flooding, but it also requires residents to have camping permits to reside in it. Despite having no formal management or services, strict rules are imposed upon the residents by municipal ordinance. Residents are unable to smoke, light fires for warmth, or possess any drugs or alcohol. Additionally, residents are required to abide by quiet hours and have strict rules governing what they are allowed to bring with them to the site. Two of the SEs within this quadrant are run by restrictive religious organizations that, while offering some supportive services, do so only with the mandate of complete sobriety, adherence to punitive rules and curfews, and participation in site maintenance and case management. Other SEs within this quadrant place PEH out of site from the public and within hazardous, disaster-prone land such as floodplains.

Four types of SEs across geographies

From a regional perspective, the majority of SEs are located in the Western United States (88%) and few in the Northeast (2%), and South (10%) (see Figure 3 below). These geographic patterns might reflect either climate differences (warmer Western states might provide more suitable locations for SEs) or diverse approaches based on regional communities of practice (for example, homelessness managers in Oregon might look at examples in nearby Washington). Further, most SEs tend to be located in politically-liberal cities such as San Francisco and Seattle.

Based on the SEs frequent location in politically-liberal cities, one might assume that such SEs would be more caring and autonomous, whereas more conservative cities would host more punitive and controlling encampments. The map in Figure 3 suggests that this is not the case. Despite variations in the general locations of SEs across political divides, the types of SEs vary significantly among cities where large clusters of SEs exist. This suggests that local contextual influences, such as proximity to schools, downtowns, or local business districts, as well as funding sources, managing bodies, and attitudes of

local neighbors and business owners might shape the geographies of different SE types more than broader political ideologies of the state or city which these SEs are located.

Discussion and conclusion

Summary of key findings

In this paper, we analyzed the SE, an increasingly-popular model of homeless management through a framework that acknowledges often-competing logics of care vs. punishment and control vs. autonomy. This study contributes to an emerging body of literature and policy by providing a basic overview of the SE model. Following Herring (2014), we developed a four-quadrant framework to analyze SEs that results in a typology of SE governance and operation. This framework helps to categorize SEs along control-autonomy and punishment-care continua.

Situating our analysis SEs within our typology, we find that SEs are scattered across all four quadrants. Several SEs exhibited clear aspects of control and punishment associated with a revanchist approach, while simultaneously providing residents with care and compassion normally attributed within a post-revanchist shift in homelessness management. More specifically, most SEs in our database were categorized as "caring but controlling," and only 12% were considered "caring and autonomous." These findings question assertions in some literature (DeVerteuil, 2019; Murphy, 2009) that homelessness management has moved beyond revanchism.

When looking at geographic distributions, few patterns exist among political leanings and SE types, despite assumptions that more autonomous, caring SEs would be located within more politically progressive cities. Nevertheless, although the majority of SEs tend to be located in more liberal cities such as San Francisco, Seattle, and Los Angeles, these cities host all four of SE types. The variability in our database findings suggests that best practices for SEs have yet to be determined and are highly dependent on their locale and management. Proponents of SEs must contend with these issues if SEs are to become more widespread and positive additions to the landscape of care for PEH.


Figure 3. Geographies of SE types.

Relationships between our findings and previous frameworks

Within each of the four quadrants in our developed framework, we find ties to the existing literature and frameworks put forth by Speer (2018), Hennigan and Speer (2019), and Herring (2014), which we discuss below.

Care/Control. From our findings, many of the SEs in this quadrant are indicative of a "compassionate revanchism" approach described by Hennigan and Speer (2019). Although several of the SEs within this quadrant are run by restrictive religious organizations, many are run by non-profits or volunteer groups who developed more authoritative regimes out of a purported desire to stay put in the city by placating local governments and surrounding businesses and residents. Hennigan and Speer (2019) state that "when private institutions are tasked with caring for the homeless, their need to attend to their own financial security often requires punitive action" (p. 914). The devolution of care from local governments to outside entities may also help cities to pass the burden of responsibility and criticism from their constituents to a less-accountable entity while still maintaining a mechanism of control over PEH. Herring (2014) suggests this is how cities can overcome "political barriers to legalization" while avoiding criticisms of neglect of PEH in their jurisdictions (p. 298). Additionally, because of the rigid maintenance and imposed rules of these encampments, these SE types can "solidify social distinctions among the homeless," between those willing to abide by the mandatory behavioral requirements and those who are not (Herring, 2014, p. 300). As such, Care/Control encampments align with Speer's (2018) concept of the "tent ward," wherein "it is only through government control that such encampments are able to access resources, which suggests that people must be disciplined to receive assistance" (p. 163).

Autonomy/Care. Most akin to the "Housing First" model, these SEs provide residents with a degree of sovereignty over one's own treatment. Autonomy/Care encampments are similar to Herring's (2014) "encampments of accommodation" in which residents are provided a sense of safety, control over their personal space, and increased respect and dignity (p. 300). According to Hennigan and Speer (2019), these spaces can "emerge in the interstices of revanchist space," offering compassion and a sense of personal autonomy to PEH amidst a landscape rife with more punitive strategies (p. 909).

Punishment/Autonomy. Many of these SEs are located on land under or adjacent to highways, on vacant rural land, or within industrial zones. They exhibit what Herring (2014) refers to as "the paradoxical function homeless seclusion," as their location away from the public realm both hides the repressive landscape of homeless management and allows for increased resident autonomy because they are detached from the critical gaze of local government and the housed public. In other words, secluded SEs can also provide a basic level of privacy that is preferable to some residents, but despite their relative autonomy, these SEs are still "subject to a certain degree of carceral management" (Speer, 2018, p. 162).

Control/Punishment. SEs within this quadrant impose perhaps the most isolating spatial tactics and rigid disciplinary practices, resembling "the mode through which carceral institutions govern criminalized populations" (Speer, 2018, p. 160). Control/Punishment SEs typify the revanchist approach to homeless management that eschews compassion associated with a broader shift towards post-revanchist practices. In this

model, municipal actors tend to impose stringent rules and regulations, seclude SEs from public view, and fail to provide supportive services (Speer, 2018, p. 162). Herring (2014) equates this management model to a "process through which particular social categories and activities are corralled, hemmed in, and isolated in a reserved and restricted quadrant of physical and social space" (p. 289).

Although SEs can offer a compassionate, albeit temporary, solution for PEH ready to transition to permanent, supportive housing, they can also include punitive entry barriers, surveillance, and behavioral restrictions of residents; justification of additional sweeps of unsanctioned encampments; further invisibilization of PEH; exposure to hazards and extremes for SE residents; and reliance on private owners as well as public bodies for land acquisition. In sum, there is no one-size-fits-all model for this land use.

Limitations and future research

There are two key limitations to this study. First, given our online research methods, the SE database is likely incomplete. New SEs might have been built since our initial analysis, and new public information might have emerged about our 50 SEs since then. Second, because most SEs do not often collect statistics on their operation, we were forced to rely on third-party reporting for many of these cases. As such, all descriptive statistics provided in the paper should be treated as approximations. Nevertheless, our database covers several regions and large cities captures a substantial sample of SEs throughout the U.S.

This work also helps identify several avenues for future research. First, this research area would benefit from a longitudinal study of the SE model as it continues to be implemented by cities. Second, future research could examine what "success" looks like for SEs, especially what kinds of SEs lead to *outflow* from homelessness and into more permanent housing. Third, future research could evaluate the impacts of SEs on surrounding communities, especially on crime, property values, and business revenues, and comparing these impacts to other models to manage homelessness such as THVs and traditional congregate shelters. Finally, it would be valuable to examine the lived experiences of PEH living in SEs, understanding how such a model affects their daily lives, health and well-being, and long-term social and economic mobility.

Policy implications

Our study offers a new understanding of some of the key challenges and opportunities for planners and policymakers to consider when adopting and implementing this model. Specifically, the new framework we present in this paper helps categorize SEs along control-autonomy and care punishment-care continua. In addition, this study might help private entities, site managers, and caregivers understand some of the potential benefits as well as drawbacks of SEs and how their use may justify further punitive treatment of PEH. Additionally, the small percentage of SEs falling within the "caring and autonomous" type suggest that SE managers aiming to move beyond revanchism need to evaluate the political, land use, and economic barriers preventing them from adopting more caring and autonomous strategies. In the end, our study confirms that SEs are an

incremental, often temporary solution to managing homelessness, which does not address the structural causes of this crisis.

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Appendix 1

Cases (Site)	Services	Location	Barriers to Entry	Y-Axis Score	Management Style	Site Rules	Management Entity	X-Axis Score	Quadrant
Phoenix Safe Outdoor Space	Not enough information to chart this case								N/A
Safe Camp	1	−1	1	**−1**	1	1	1	**3**	Punishment/Autonomy
Berkeley Underpass Encampment	−1	−1	1	**−1**	1	1	1	**3**	Punishment/Autonomy
Safe Sleep Village	1	1	1	**3**	0	0	0	**0**	Compassion Axis
Veterans Row - Care, Treatment and Rehabilitative Services Initiative	Not enough information to chart this case								N/A
Modesto Outdoor Emergency Shelter	1	−1	1	**1**	0	1	0	**1**	Autonomy/Care
West Oakland Encampment	0	−1	1	**0**	1	1	1	**3**	Dependence Axis
35th and Peralta Encampment	Not enough information to chart this case								N/A
Gateway Oaks Drive Safe Ground Encampment (Sacramento Safe Ground)	Not enough information to chart this case								N/A
Sacramento Safe Ground	Not enough information to chart this case								N/A
San Clemente Encampment	−1	0	0	**−1**	−1	0	−1	**−2**	Control/Punishment
Gough Safe Sleep Village	1	1	1	**3**	0	1	0	**1**	Autonomy/Care
Haight Safe Sleeping Village	1	1	1	**3**	1	1	0	**2**	Autonomy/Care
Tenderloin Safe Sleeping Village	Not enough information to chart this case								N/A
Fulton Safe Sleep Village	0	0	1	**1**	0	1	0	**1**	Autonomy/Care
Finley Sanctioned Encampment	1	0	0	**1**	−1	−1	−1	**−3**	Care/Control
Hope Village	Not enough information to chart this case								N/A
W-X Safe Ground	1	−1	1	**1**	1	1	0	**2**	Autonomy/Care
Balboa Park Sanctioned Encampment	0	−1	1	**0**	0	1	0	**1**	Dependence Axis
	−1	−1	−1	**−3**	−1	−1	−1	**−3**	

Continued.

Cases (Site)	Services	Location	Barriers to Entry	Y-Axis Score	Management Style	Site Rules	Management Entity	X-Axis Score	Quadrant
San Lorenzo Park Benchlands Encampment									Control/ Punishment
River Haven	1	−1	0	**0**	0	0	0	**0**	Center
Regis Safe Outdoor Space	1	0	0	**1**	−1	−1	0	**−2**	Care/Control
Park Hill SOS	1	1	−1	**1**	−1	−1	0	**−1**	Care/Control
Denver Health SOS	1	1	0	**2**	−1	−1	0	**−2**	Care/Control
Denver Human Services SOS	1	0	0	**1**	−1	−1	0	**−2**	Care/Control
Grant Street SOS	1	1	0	**2**	−1	−1	0	**−2**	Care/Control
Capitol Hill SOS	1	1	0	**2**	−1	−1	0	**−2**	Care/Control
Purple Cliffs Encampment	0	−1	1	**0**	1	1	1	**3**	Dependence Axis
Pinellas Hope	1	−1	−1	**−1**	−1	−1	−1	**−3**	Control/ Punishment
Hillsborough Hope	1	−1	−1	**−1**	−1	−1	−1	**−3**	Control/ Punishment
North Athens Sanctioned Encampment	0	−1	−1	**−2**	−1	−1	−1	**−3**	Control/ Punishment
Shinnah Haven	1	0	1	**2**	1	1	0	**2**	Autonomy/Care
Camp Kikaha	0	0	0	**0**	0	1	1	**2**	Dependence Axis
Missoula's Temporary Safe Outdoor Space	−1	−1	1	**−1**	0	1	1	**2**	Punishment/ Autonomy
Safe Camping Area	1	−1	0	**0**	0	0	0	**0**	Center
Camp Hope	1	0	1	**2**	0	0	0	**0**	Compassion Axis
Camp on Industrial Street	Not enough information to chart this case								n/a
Stop the Risk	1	1	1	**3**	0	0	0	**0**	Compassion Axis
Temporary Alternative Shelter Location	−1	0	−1	**−2**	−1	−1	−1	**−3**	Control/ Punishment
Olympia Mitigation Site	1	0	1	**2**	0	0	−1	**−1**	Care/Control
Nickelsville Tent City	−1	−1	−1	**−3**	1	−1	1	**1**	Punishment/ Autonomy
Interbay Village - District 7	1	−1	−1	**−1**	1	−1	1	**1**	Punishment/ Autonomy
Myers Way (Camp Second Chance) - District 1	1	0	−1	**0**	1	1	1	**3**	Dependence Axis
Othello Village - District 2	0	1	−1	**0**	0	−1	0	**−1**	Dependence Axis n/a

Cases (Site)	Services	Location	Barriers to Entry	Y-Axis Score	Management Style	Site Rules	Management Entity	X-Axis Score	Quadrant
Northlake (Was originally Nickelsville Ballard)	Not enough information to chart this case								
Camp United We Stand	−1	1	−1	**−1**	1	−1	1	**1**	Compassion Axis
Share Wheel Tent City 4	−1	−1	−1	**−3**	1	−1	1	**1**	Punishment/Autonomy
Tacoma Stability Site	1	−1	−1	**−1**	−1	0	0	**−1**	Control/Punishment
Camp Unity Eastside	1	1	−1	**1**	0	−1	0	**−1**	Care/Control
Campsite at Dairy Drive	Not enough information to chart this case	0							n/a